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The Income Tax Act1 sets various time limited on actions by the Minister and the Taxpayer.  
These time limits are there to promote a balance between the need for proper administration of 
the Act in relation to each taxpayer’s affairs and certainty/finality for both the taxpayer and the 
Minister.  One of such time period is the “normal reassessment period” found in section 152.  
The Act allows for a taxpayer to waive the normal reassessment period, thereby allowing the 
Minister to reassess the taxpayer beyond this time period.   
This paper examines waivers of the normal reassessment period in the context of the Income Tax 
Act, examines the judicial interpretation and application of such waivers, and provides guidance 
for judges faced with waiver issues.   
*Sas Ansari is a PhD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.    Sas holds an LL.M. from Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University, as well as J.D. (with Business Law certification), B.Ed., and B.Sc. degrees from the 
University of British Columbia. You can view some of his other papers at http://ssrn.com/author=2185221, and view 
his Canadian case comments at http://ita-annotated.ca/RecentDecisions. Contact him at 
sasanansari@osgoode.yorku.ca.  His current research interests include domestic and international treatment of 
property, taxation, income, and wealth 
1 RSC 1985 c 1 (5th Supp.) [“ITA”] 
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Waivers of Limitation Periods in the Income Tax Act – Judicial Interpretations and 
Approaches 
1. Introduction
The Income Tax Act2 sets various time limits on actions by the Minister of National 
Revenue3 as well as the Taxpayer4.  These various time limits are meant to promote the smooth 
administration of the ITA,5 and to provide a balance between certainty/finality and appropriate 
flexibility for both the Minister and the Taxpayer.  It is important to understand how to navigate 
the matters that affect these time periods.  
An example of the balance between certainty/finality and flexibility is found in Section 
152 of the ITA dealing with Assessments.6  After a taxpayer has filed the required return(s) of 
income,7 the Minister must examine the return(s) of income and assess the tax for the year 
(including any interest and penalties, if payable, and any refund8 or amount deemed paid9) with all 
2 ITA, supra note 1. 
3 Under the ITA, subsection 220(1), the Minister (defined in Subsection 248(1) to mean the Minister of National 
Revenue) is tasked with administering and enforcing the ITA, and grants the Commissioner of Revenue the power to 
exercise all of the Minister’s powers and perform all of the Minister’s duties under the ITA.  Further delegation of 
powers for the purpose of administering and enforcing the Act is allowed under Subsection 220(2.01) of the ITA.  
4 “Taxpayer” is defined in Subsection 248(1) to include any “person” whether or not liable to pay tax. “Person” is 
defined in Subsection 248(1) and reads: 
 "person", or any word or expression descriptive of a person, includes any corporation, and any entity exempt, 
because of subsection 149(1), from tax under Part I on all or part of the entity's taxable income and the heirs, 
executors, liquidators of a succession, administrators or other legal representatives of such a person, 
according to the law of that part of Canada to which the context extends; 
5 For example see ITA, supra note 1 Subsection 150(1) that sets out the time limits for filing returns of income. 
6 Not all limitation periods will be discussed in this paper.  The examples presented have been selected in order to 
provide an adequate context within which to discuss the judicial approach to, and interpretation of, waivers of 
limitations periods.   
7 The ITA does not require the Minister to wait for a taxpayer to file a return of income.  The ITA, in Subsection 
152(7), grants the Minister the power to make an assessment notwithstanding any return or information supplied 
by the Taxpayer or to assess the Taxpayer where no return has been filed.  This is often referred to as an ‘arbitrary 
assessment’.   
8 ITA, supra note 1, paragraph 152(1)(a). 
9 ITA, supra note 1, paragraph 152(1)(b). 
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due dispatch.10  With regards to partnership income determinations, the Minister is given the 
authority to determine the income or loss of a partnership for a fiscal period (or any other amount 
or matter relevant in determining the tax consequences for any member of a partnership) within 3 
years of the latter of two dates.11  This, however, does not end the matter for either the Taxpayer 
or the Minister. 
The Minister has the power to “make an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment 
of tax for a taxation year, interest or penalties, if any, payable under [Part I] by a taxpayer” at any 
time.12  However, this power to assess at any time is limited.13  If the Minister wishes to make an 
assessment, reassessment or additional assessment after the taxpayer’s “normal reassessment 
period”14 for a year, specific exceptions must be satisfied.15  There most obvious of the exceptions 
fall into two general categories.  The first general category provides for exceptions where the 
Minister may (but need not) make an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment at any 
time.16  The second general category includes circumstances where the Minister is required to 
10 ITA, supra note 1, Subsection 152(1).  Note that the phrase “due dispatch” does not impose a particular time limit 
on the Minister.  Rather, it provides the necessary flexibility for the Minister to proceed with a reasonable 
assessment, and no fault can be found so long as the Minister acts for the proper purpose of determining the 
Taxpayer’s liability under the ITA: see for example, Ficek v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 502.   
11 ITA, supra note 1, Subsection 152(1.4).  See also, the ability to waive the determination limitation period in respect 
of partnerships in Subsection 152(1.9) of the ITA.   
12 ITA, supra note 1, Subsection 152(4). 
13 Note that there are many provisions within the ITA that specify that an assessment can be made by the Minister 
“notwithstanding subsection 152(4) to (5)”.  This has the effect of ensuring that there is no limitation period on the 
Minister’s ability to assess.  Some examples include: Subsection 69(12) Tax-deferred disposition of property; 
subsection 143.4(7) deduction of contingent amount; or subsection 67.5(2) Illegal Payments.  Additionally, other 
provisions state that an assessment can be made at “anytime”, again expressly denying the existence of a limitation 
period (see for example subsection 159(3) liability of legal representative).   
14 The “normal reassessment period” is defined in Subsection 152(3.1) of the ITA. 
15 The CRA is of the view that there is no assessment deadline if no initial assessment has been issued (see CRA 
Document 2001-0399451I7; see also CRA Document 2013-0476501I7).  This makes sense since in a self-assessing 
system the tax authority must be given an opportunity to examine a taxpayer’s return before a limitation period 
applies.   
16 ITA, supra note 1, paragraph 152(4)(a). Note, however, that “any time” is limited by subsection 152(4.1) in respect 
of the exception in subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii) if the taxpayer files a revocation. Additionally, subsection 152(4.01) 
provides further limitations on the Minister’s ability to make an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment 
outside of the normal reassessment period.   
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assess, reassess or additionally assess, but only if the Minister does so before the day that is three 
(3) years after the expiry of the taxpayer’s normal reassessment period.17  
The first general category of exceptions to the normal reassessment period contains two 
subcategories.  The first subcategory that removes the limitation on the Minister’s power to assess, 
reassess or additionally assess is mean to protect the integrity of Canada’s self-filing system.18  
This power is not penal, but rather remedial.19  The limitation of the normal reassessment period 
is meant to provide diligent and honest taxpayers with certainty/finality with regards to their 
financial affairs. This certainty/finality is ill-permitted to, and undesirable for, taxpayers or tax 
filers who have approached their duty(-ies) under the ITA without due care or have deliberately 
attempted to manipulate the tax consequences attaching to a taxpayer’s actions.  To prevent 
taxpayer’s from profiting from their dereliction of responsibilities with regards to income taxation, 
the ITA permits the Minister to assess, reassess or additionally assess a taxpayer or person filing 
the return20 at any time where the taxpayer “has made any misrepresentation that is attributable to 
neglect, carelessness or willful default or has committed any fraud in filing the return or in 
supplying any information under” the ITA.21  
The second subcategory that allows the Minister to assess, reassess or additionally assess 
at any time, irrespective of the normal reassessment period, is meant to allow for the Minister and 
the Taxpayer to cooperate in determining the taxpayer’s liability/entitlement.22  This exception 
                                                 
17 ITA, supra note 1, paragraph 152(4)(b).   
18 See for example the comments of the Federal Court of Appeal in Johnson v The Queen, 2012 FCA 253.  See also 
the comments of the Tax Court of Canada in Vine Estate v The Queen, 2014, TCC 64.  
19 College Park Motors Ltd v The Queen, 2009 TCC 409.   
20 The phrase “person filing the return” is not meant to capture the listed actions by tax-professionals or tax-
preparers that file a return or a taxpayer, but rather to ensure that where a person other than the taxpayer (for 
example a legal representative) is tasked by the ITA to file a taxpayer’s returns, the listed actions by that person 
allow the Minister to assess, reassess or additionally assess beyond the normal-reassessment period.  See Vine Estate 
v The Queen, 2014, TCC 64.  
21 ITA, supra note 1, subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i).   
22 A waiver is seen as a useful and flexible tool for taxpayers in settlements of tax disputes.  See Lisa M MacDonell, 
“Settlement of Tax Disputes at the Appeals and Audit Stage” (2012) Tax Dispute Resolution Compliance, and 
Administration Conference (Canadian Tax Foundation).  See also Bruce Russell, “Assessments, Reassessments and 
Waivers” (2012) Tax Dispute Resolution Compliance, and Administration Conference (Canadian Tax Foundation).   
The courts have recognized that a waiver is beneficial to both the Crown and the Taxpayer (see Cal Investments Ltd 
v The Queen, 90 DTC 6556.  However, some commentators are of the view that a waiver is the exercise of a privilege 
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operates only on the initiative of the taxpayer or the person filing the return.23  Specifically, the 
ITA allows the Minister to assess, reassess or additionally assess beyond the normal re-assessment 
period where the taxpayer or person filing the return “has filed with the Minister a waiver in 
prescribed form within the normal reassessment period for the taxpayer in respect of the year”.24  
This waiver of the normal reassessment period is the focus of this paper. 
2. Waiver of the Normal Reassessment Period Pursuant to Subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii) 
This portion of the paper will briefly outline and discuss waivers of the normal 
reassessment period under subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii). Judicial decisions in regards to such 
waivers will be discussed in Part 3 of the paper. 
A waiver is part of the reassessment process and provides the taxpayer with an opportunity 
to extend the normal reassessment period when the taxpayer deems it to be advantageous to do 
so.25   As stated, the ability for taxpayers or person’s filing a return to waive the normal 
reassessment period is found in subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii).26   The conditions for a waiver under 
subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii) are: 
                                                 
of the taxpayer in favour of the Minister that has the effect of releasing the Minister from statutory time limits (see 
A Christina Tari, “Waivering” (2002) Canadian Tax Foundation Conference Report 13:1).   
23 The cooperation of the Minister is, to the extent of accepting the waiver, mandatory.  The Minister must accept 
any document containing the required information and must treat it as a waiver.  See Mitchell v Canada, 2002 FCA 
407, where the court at paragraph 40 stated: 
[40] It seems to me that Revenue Canada is obliged to treat any document as a waiver, providing it contains 
the necessary information. Revenue Canada does not have an option as to whether or not to accept a waiver. 
A waiver is a privilege which a taxpayer has, and, if sent, Revenue Canada cannot disregard it. 
24 ITA, supra note 1, subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii).  Note that Subsection 152(1.9) allows for a waiver in respect of a 
determination in respect of a partnership under Subsection 152(1.4).  The considerations applicable to waivers under 
subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii) apply mutatis mutandis to waivers under subsection 152(1.9), and will not be specifically 
discussed in this paper.   
25 The advantage to the taxpayer may simply be avoiding an arbitrary assessment by the CRA so as to protect their 
interest when faced with the expiry of the reassessment period.  The Federal Court of Appeal has held that an 
assessment without any basis other than serving as a protective assessment is valid (see Karda v The Queen, 2006 
FCA 238). Similarly, the Tax Court of Canada in Charron v The Queen, [1998] 1 CTC 3096 (TCC) stated at page 3101: 
The purpose of a waiver is to continue analysis of a transaction or matter concerning which the basis of the 
assessment is in question.... The Minister could have assessed immediately since he was still within the 
normal assessment period.... [F]or the sake of efficiency, it was just as well to accept this mutual 
accommodation rather than make a hasty assessment, which would not be in the interests of the taxpayer or 
of the Minister as the administrator of the Act. 
26 The provision reads: 
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 The waiver must be filed27 by either the taxpayer or the person filing the return;28 
 The waiver must be filed with the Minister;29 
 The waiver must be in the prescribed form;30 and  
                                                 
152 (4) Assessment and reassessment — The Minister may at any time make an assessment, reassessment 
or additional assessment of tax for a taxation year, interest or penalties, if any, payable under this Part by a 
taxpayer or notify in writing any person by whom a return of income for a taxation year has been filed that 
no tax is payable for the year, except that an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment may be 
made after the taxpayer's normal reassessment period in respect of the year only if 
(a) the taxpayer or person filing the return 
(i) […] 
(ii) has filed with the Minister a waiver in prescribed form within the normal reassessment period for the 
taxpayer in respect of the year; 
[…] 
[emphasis added] 
27 The issue of what constitutes “filing” in respect of a waiver was considered by the Tax Court of Canada in Holmes 
v The Queen, 2005 TCC 403, where the court at paragraph 4 said: 
The onus of proving its filing rests with the Minister. Although the Act prescribes the form of the waiver, it 
does not prescribe the manner in which, or otherwise define how filing is to be achieved; accordingly, whether 
a waiver has been "filed" will depend on the evidence presented. 
28 A waiver filed by the taxpayer or person who files the return’s lawyer or accountant (or other person) authorized 
by the taxpayer or person who files the return to deal with the CRA has been found to be valid.  See Mitchell v 
Canada, 2002 FCA 407; see also Ackaoui v Canada, 2006 FCA 315.   
However, the courts have recognised that a waiver obtained under duress may be invalid (see Guerette v The Queen, 
[1996] 1 CTC 2780).  Also, a waiver obtained by treachery or trickery from a person who did not understand the 
waiver has been held to be invalid (see Karakas v The Queen, 1995 CarswellNat 1946 (TCC); see also Arpeg Holdings 
v The Queen, 2008 FCA 31; and Sljivar v The Queen, 2009 TCC 581). To challenge a waiver on the basis of duress, 
treachery, or trickery declaratory relief must be sought from the Federal Court by making an application for judicial 
review (see Qureshi v. MNR, 92 DTC 1150 (TCC)).   
29 The cases accept the existence of de facto waivers. One example of a circumstance where, without filing an actual 
waiver, the Court held there to be a Waiver, was in Mitchell v Canada, 2002 FCA 407.  In that case the Minister had 
agreed with the taxpayer to assess the taxpayer on the basis of the outcome of a test case. The Minister, in a case 
like Mitchell considers itself to be bound by the agreement, which acts as a waiver. See CRA Doc 2004-0085251E5 
where the CRA states:  
In circumstances as described in the above paragraph, we are of the view that the Minister would be required 
to assess or reassess by reason of the agreement entered into between the taxpayer and the CRA, and not by 
reason of the waiver filed with the Minister. 
Another example is a de facto waiver is set out in the CRA Taxation Operations Manual at paragraph 1932.4(2)(B). 
Where a taxpayer submits a written request for an adjustment, the essential requirements of a waiver are met, the 
request is made close to the statue-barred date, and if due to work-load constraints the return is statute barred 
before the assessor has a chance to review it, then the CRA treats the request for adjustment as a waiver.   
30 Although the ITA specifically states that the waiver must be filed in the prescribed form, this is declaratory only 
(see Cal Investments Ltd v The Queen (1990), 37 FR 250, 44 DTC 6556).  The  Interpretation Act, RSC 1985 c I-21, at 
Section 32,  deals with the effect of deviating from a prescribed form, and provides: 
32. Where a form is prescribed, deviations from that form, not affecting the substance or calculated to 
mislead, do not invalidate the form used. 
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 The waiver must be filed within the normal reassessment period for the taxpayer in respect 
of the year in respect of which the normal reassessment period is being waived.31 
Where the taxpayer has filed a valid waiver with respect of a year, the Minister may assess, 
reassess or additionally assess the taxpayer for that year beyond the normal reassessment period.32  
However, the ability to go beyond the reassessment period need not be completely open-ended.  
There are two ways that a waiver can be limited by the taxpayer.   
The first way to limit a waiver operates as a limitation on the time-period during which the 
waiver is valid.33 This limitation is effected by filing a revocation of the waiver with the Minister.34  
Revoking a waiver does immediately end the Minister’s power to assess, reassesses or additionally 
assess outside of the normal reassessment period, but rather limits the Minister’s ability to do so 
by preventing the making of a late assessment, reassessment or additional assessment to before the 
                                                 
Therefore, so long as a document containing all of the required information is filed with the Minister, the Minister 
must accept it and treat is as a waiver (see Mitchell v Canada, 2002 FCA 407).   
31 The Minister does not have the discretion to accept a waiver that is filed after the expiry of the normal 
reassessment period for the taxpayer in respect of the pertinent year.  A waiver filed outside of this period does not 
permit the Minister on his own or on the request of the taxpayer to reassess beyond the normal reassessment period 
(See Canadian Marconi Co v The Queen (1991), 51 FTR 159, leave to appeal to SCC refused (1992) 139 NR 395 (SCC); 
see also Stone Container Canada (Inc) v The Queen, [1998] 3 CTC 2150 (TCC)).  However, see the decision of the TCC 
in Holmes v The Queen, 2005 TCC 403, where the court at paragraph 20 stated that “the power to accept the waiver 
lies exclusively with the Minister”.   
In Holmes v The Queen, 2005 TCC 403, the Tax Court of Canada clarified that the Minister bears the burden of proving 
the filing of a waiver.   
Note that paragraph 152(4)(c), though intended to apply only to circumstances where a reassessment could 
otherwise have been issued within the extended reassessment period (see subparagraphs 152(4)(b)(i) to (iv)), could 
be interpreted as permitting a 3-year blanket extension to the waiver filing deadline.  See Michael Kandev, “Changes 
of Statute of Limitations Should be Welcome to Taxpayers But Contains Technical Glitches” (2009) XV:1 International 
Tax Planning 1030 (Federated Press).   
32 There is no requirement that the Minister actually do anything after the waiver is granted, and there is no 
limitation as to the number of assessments, reassessments or additional assessments that the Minister may make 
during the time period where the waiver is effective (See Remillard v The Queen, 2011 TCC 327).  However, the 
Quebec Court of Appeal, in Banque Nationale du Canada v Quebec, 41 No 92 F-120 Droit Fiscal Express (CQ), held 
that the Minister is only entitled to make one assessment when relying on a waiver.   
33 Absent a revocation, a waiver continues to operate indefinitely.  It is for this reason that ‘stapled waivers’ are used. 
34 ITA, supra note 1, Subsection 152(4.1).  A revocation is effective in revoking a waiver under subparagraph 
152(4)(a)(ii) or Paragraphs 152(4)(c) or (c.1) only.  This provision does not contemplate a revocation of a waiver in 
respect of a determination period filed in respect of a partnership under Subsection 152(1.9).  It may be that this is 
merely a technical oversight, just as recognized by the CRA in respect of the previous absence of a reference to 
paragraph 152(4)(c) from Subsection 152(4.1); see “Revenue Canada Roundtable” (1987) 47:1 Conference Report 
29, questions 44 and 45.   
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day that is six months after the date on which the notice of the revocation in the prescribed form 
is filed.35  There is no statutory provision that allow for the revocation/cancellation of a revocation 
of a waiver.36 However, where the normal reassessment period in respect of a year has not yet 
expired, another waiver may be filed.37   
The second way to limit a waiver operates as a limitation on the scope of matters that in 
respect of which the Minister can make an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment.38  
This limitation of the scope of matters to which the waiver relates is highlighted in the prescribed 
form.39 The Form contemplates specifying a particular aspect or matter for the relevant taxation 
year (or taxation years) to which the waiver applies.40  The failure to word the waiver sufficiently 
                                                 
35 ITA, supra note 1, Subsection 152(4.1).   
36 See A Christina Tari, “Waivering” (2002) Canadian Tax Foundation Conference Report 13:1.   
37 See David W. Smith, "Reassessments, Waivers, Amended Returns, and Refunds," Income Tax Enforcement, 
Compliance, and Administration, 1988 Corporate Management Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 
1988), 8:1.   
38 ITA, supra note 1, Subparagraph 152(4.01)(a)(ii).  That subparagraph limits the Minister’s ability to assess, reassess 
or additionally assess outside of the normal reassessment period, when relying on a waiver under Subparagraph 
152(4)(a)(ii) to the matter specified in the waiver, and reads: 
(4.01) Extended period assessment — Notwithstanding subsections (4) and (5), an assessment, reassessment 
or additional assessment to which paragraph (4)(a), (b), (b.1) or (c) applies in respect of a taxpayer for a 
taxation year may be made after the taxpayer's normal reassessment period in respect of the year to the 
extent that, but only to the extent that, it can reasonably be regarded as relating to, 
(a) where paragraph (4)(a) applies to the assessment, reassessment or additional assessment, 
(i) […] 
(ii) a matter specified in a waiver filed with the Minister in respect of the year; and 
[…] 
Subsection 152(4.01) contains additional limitations applicable to other circumstances.  Additionally, the scope of 
the assessment, reassessment or additional assessment is limits to only those amounts included in computing the 
taxpayer’s income or purposes of an assessment under the ITA, made prior to the expiry of the normal reassessment 
period in respect of that year, that can reasonably be regarded as relating to a matter specified in a waiver filed in 
respect of that year.   
39 The prescribed from is T2029, ”Waiver in respect of the normal reassessment period or extended reassessment 
period”.  In the portion of the form tilted “waiver” the person filling out the form is asked to check the appropriate 
box.  The words following the box referring to a waiver under subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii) reads: 
The normal reassessment period referred to in subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, within which 
the Minister may reassess or make additional assessments or assess tax, interest or penalties under the Act 
is hereby waived for the taxation year indicated above, in respect of: 
[…] 
[emphasis added] 
40 Note that not specifying a limitation of the scope of matters in respect of which a waiver is filed does not result in 
a waiver being void (see Fietz v The Queen, 2011 TCC 439). 
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narrowly may allow the CRA to issue an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment that 
is broader in scope than was intended by the taxpayer.41 In order to use the limitation in scope and 
the use of revocations to maximum effect, may consider failing a separate waiver with respect of 
each separate matter.42 
3. Judicial Interpretations of Waivers of Limitation Periods under the ITA 
This paper will not be considering the entire range of judicial decisions that rely on, refer 
to, or relate to ITA subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii).  Rather, this paper will focus only on the decisions 
that relate to the scope of a waiver, and therefore to the scope of matters which the Minister may 
make an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment with respect of outside of the normal 
reassessment period when relying on a waiver of limitation periods.43 
3.1. Supreme Court of Canada Decisions 
The author was not able to find any Supreme Court of Canada decisions dealing directly 
with the interpretation of a waiver or the determination of the scope of the waiver pursuant to 
subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii). 
                                                 
41 For the importance of carefully wording the matters in respect of which a waiver is provided, see Cheryl A Gibson 
and Daniel V Misutka, “The Art of Resolving Tax Disputes” (2011) Prairie Provinces Tax Conference (Canadian Tax 
Foundation).   
42 See Colin Campbell, Administration of Income Tax 2013 (Carswell: Toronto, ON, 2013). 
43 A taxpayer seeking to challenge the contents of a waiver, not to have it nullified because of duress, 
misrepresentation, trickery, or treachery on behalf of the CRA, falls under the jurisdiction of the Tax Court of Canada. 
The challenge is brought in the course of an income tax appeal.  See A Christina Tari, “Waivering” (2002) Canadian 
Tax Foundation Conference Report 13:1, where it is written: 
If the taxpayer seeks to challenge the waiver on the basis of what it says, however, it appears that the Tax 
Court of Canada has jurisdiction to determine whether the waiver is valid in the context of an income tax 
appeal. In other words, where, for example, in the course of an income tax appeal the taxpayer challenges 
the jurisdiction of the minister to assess on the basis that the waiver does not cover the assessing position 
relied upon by the minister, the issue then before the Tax Court of Canada would constitute a challenge to 
the validity of the assessment, an issue that this court is empowered to determine. 
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3.2.Federal Court of Appeal Decisions 
3.2.1. Honeywell Ltd v The Queen, 2007 FCA 22 
In Honeywell,44 the Federal Court of Appeal considered the nature of waivers, and at 
paragraph 32 stated: 
32     A waiver when given by a taxpayer and accepted by the Minister gives rise to a 
bargain of sorts. The taxpayer foregoes the benefit of the normal prescription period for the 
particular year with respect to the matter specified in the waiver, and the Minister, relying 
on the waiver, acquires the right to reassess outside the normal assessment period, but only 
with respect to the matter specified in the waiver. Just as the taxpayer cannot alter the 
waiver once given, the Minister cannot issue a reassessment that does not reasonably relate 
to the matter specified in the waiver. As pointed out by Bowman C.J., this is made clear by 
the language of subparagraph 152(4.01)(a)(ii) which provides that when relying on a 
waiver the Minister may reassess, “but only to the extent that, [the reassessment] can 
reasonably be regarded as relating to, ... a matter specified in a waiver filed by the Minister 
in respect of the year, ...”. Accordingly, where a reassessment has been issued pursuant to 
a waiver, the reference to a “reassessment” in subsection 152(4) can only mean a 
reassessment as permitted by the waiver. 
3.2.2. Mitchell v The Queen, 2002 FCA 407 
In Mitchell45 the taxpayer had, through his lawyer, come to an agreement with Revenue 
Canada to have the appellant assessed on the basis of the outcome of a test case.  Revenue Canada 
stated that it could not reassess the taxpayer because the taxpayer had failed to file a waiver in the 
form required under the ITA.  The taxpayer’s lawyer had sent all the required information called 
for in a waiver in a letter to Revenue Canada prior to the expiry of the normal reassessment period.   
The Court referred to cases where the Minister had argued that waivers were valid despite 
containing errors.  In Gestion B. Dufresne Ltée46, the waiver referred to the wrong taxation year.  
The court in that case held that the error was a “careless mistake” that did not invalidate the waiver.  
In Placements T.S. Inc.,47 there was a discrepancy between the contents of the waiver and the issue 
under appeal (waiver related to the land and the assessment related to the building), but despite 
                                                 
44 Honeywell Ltd v The Queen, 2007 FCA 22. 
45 Mitchell v The Queen, 2002 FCA 407.   
46 Gestion B. Dufresne Ltée v. the Queen (1998), 98 D.T.C. 2078. 
47 Placements T.S. Inc. v. The Queen, [1994] 1 C.T.C. 2464, 94 D.T.C. 1302.   
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this substantive error in the waiver it was held to be valid as the “taxpayer was not surprised by 
the assessment [and the] reassessment reasonably related to the mater for which the waiver was 
issued”.48  In Solberg,49 the waiver referred only to Part III tax while the reassessment concerned 
Part I tax.  The Federal Court held that reference to Part III was a mistake and a technical defect 
that did not impair the substance of the waiver. The Court held that “[t]he appropriate approach to 
the interpretation of the waiver is to seek to ascertain the intention of the parties as expressed in 
that document together with any relevant circumstances for which evidence is available”, and in 
this case the surrounding circumstances together with the text of the waiver as a whole demonstrate 
that both parties knew what was at issue.50   
The FCA stated that “the Crown was unable to demonstrate any prejudice by the actions 
of the appellants [, had] notice of all relevant and necessary facts from the beginning when it agreed 
to reassess on the basis of the test case, [had received letters] contain all of the information to 
which Revenue Canada was entitled by way of waiver[, and was merely seeking] to avoid on [a] 
technicality the terms of an agreement which it now admits it had entered into”.51   
3.3. Federal Court Decisions 
3.3.1. CAL Investments Ltd v Canada, [1991] 1 FC 199  
The Federal Court, in Cal Investments,52 spoke about the nature and purpose of waivers of 
limitations periods under the ITA.  It stated, at pages 213 – 14: 
A waiver of the sort at issue in this case, might be interpreted as an accommodation 
between the Crown and a taxpayer for the better administration of the Income Tax Act and 
to provide a more efficient determination of any liability thereunder. In the light of the 
limitations on assessments under s. 152 of the Act, the Crown requests a waiver so that it 
may continue its assessment or audit work in a normal administrative mode without having 
to worry about limitations. The taxpayer, on the other hand, knows full well that on an 
assessment being made, he alone has the burden of proving it wrong. That burden becomes 
much heavier if the Crown, facing the end of the limitation period, issues what might be 
termed a premature assessment which, for purposes of abundant caution, would include 
                                                 
48 Mitchell v The Queen, 2002 FCA 407 at para 36.   
49 Solberg (S.J.) v. Canada, [1992] 2 C.T.C. 208, 92 D.T.C. 6448 
50 Mitchell v The Queen, 2002 FCA 407 at para 37.   
51 Mitchell v The Queen, 2002 FCA 407 at para 43.  
52 CAL Investments Ltd v The Queen, [1991] 1 FC 199. 
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many sundry items which the taxpayer would have to traverse one by one. The taxpayer in 
those circumstances would look upon a waiver as being to his own benefit as well as the 
Crown's and would ordinarily comply with the Crown's request. 
In many cases, also, the waiver might be limited to specified issues, i.e., those where 
assessing or auditing processes have not been completed and which in fact remain the only 
outstanding items on which the Crown can ultimately decide to assess or reassess. This 
narrows the field of the assessment and again provides mutual advantages to both the 
Crown and the taxpayer. 
Furthermore, the court outlined the special nature of waivers under the ITA, and stated at 
page 217-18: 
A further element in the matter before me is that this waiver, however prescribed in its 
form, is not a statutory obligation imposed on a taxpayer over which, in appropriate cases, 
statutory defences might be raised. A waiver, as prescribed in this case, is no more, no less 
a consensual arrangement between the taxpayer and the Crown to accept a delayed process 
for an assessment to be made for reasons which are mutually advantageous. 
3.3.2. Soldberg v The Queen, [1992] 2 CTC 208 (FCTD) 
In Soldberg,53 the court was faced with determining whether the reference in a waiver to 
Part III tax had the effect of invalidating a reassessment in respect to Part I.  The Court, at paragraph 
13, stated that: 
13     Having concluded that the reference in the waiver to Part III was an error, I must then 
consider whether the waiver is invalid for the purposes of reassessing the taxpayer for Part 
I tax. I am not prepared to so conclude. In my view, the error is a technical defect which 
does not impair the substance of the waiver. The appropriate approach to the interpretation 
of the waiver is to seek to ascertain the intention of the parties as expressed in that 
document together with any relevant circumstances for which evidence is available. This 
is consistent with the approach taken in interpreting taxing statutes themselves, see, for 
example, Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, 1984 CanLII 20 (SCC), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 
536, [1984] C.T.C. 294, 84 D.T.C. 6305, at pages 315–16 C.T.C. (D.T.C. 6323). 
This approach was approved by the Federal Court of Appeal in Mitchell.54 
                                                 
53 Soldberg v The Queen, [1992] 2 CTC 208 (FCTD).  
54 Mitchell v The Queen, 2002 FCA 407 at para 37.   
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3.4.Tax Court of Canada Decisions 
3.4.1. Fagan v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 523 
The Taxpayer filed a waiver with the Minister, and had specifically amended the wording 
of the Minister to limit the waiver to a specific joint venture.  The evidence disclosed that the 
taxpayers had, on the advice of a lawyer, used wording in the waiver to ensure that other ventures 
were not included in the waiver.  The CRA knew of the limitation and did not consider it to be a 
problem.   
The taxpayer argued that although a technical defect in a waiver does not render it invalid, 
a substantive defect does.  The taxpayer also argued that there was no common understanding 
between him and the Minister.   
The Minister “ submitted that the appropriate approach is to ascertain the intention of the 
parties as expressed in the waiver together with any relevant circumstances for which evidence is 
available; technical defects do not invalidate a waiver where circumstances show that both parties 
knew what was in issue; given the nature of a waiver, a matter specified in a waiver must involve 
a substantial issue between the parties, and in determining what is reasonably related to a matter 
specified in a waiver, the view of an objective observer with knowledge of all the pertinent facts 
rather than the subjective view of either party is considered reasonable; a waiver provides the 
benefit of time to both parties; and finally, the purpose of a waiver is to allow the continued 
analysis of the matter at issue; the description of the matter cannot be expected to be perfect at the 
stage of drafting the waiver and the reassessment must relate to the transaction or matter which is 
the source of the disagreement between the parties and concerning which the taxpayer agreed to 
sign a waiver.”55 
The Court agreed that the scope of a waiver must be ascertained by determining the 
intention of the parties through analysis of the contents of the waiver and the relevant 
circumstances.56  Extrinsic evidence is important in the analysis of the scope of a waiver, with the 
                                                 
55  Fagan v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 523 at para 29. 
56 Fagan v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 523 at para 34.  
This paper is a Draft, and may contain errors in spelling, grammar, and reference links.   
Page 15 of 30 
 
absence of evidence being able to influence the court’s decision as strongly as its presence.57  
Specifically, the court referred to the decision in Brown,58 in stating that a waiver is not a contract 
“whose interpretation must exclude extrinsic evidence [but rather that] relevant surrounding 
circumstances play an important role in its interpretation”.59 
Where there is a complication with a waiver, the courts take an objective or common-sense 
approach to determine whether the matter specified in the waiver is one that is reasonably related 
to the matter that was assessed by the Minister.60  A reassessment can reasonably be regarded as 
relating to the matter in the waiver where the taxpayer was not surprised by the basis on which the 
reassessment was made by the Minister, or where the basis is known to both parties.61  In other 
words, the courts are willing to affirm the validity of the waiver where doing do would not 
prejudice either party.62 
In this case, the appellant was not a member of the joint venture specified in the waiver. 
However, the court held that where the reassessment is “normally connected with or flows from 
the matter specified in the waiver”, the waiver will be valid in respect of the reassessment.63  The 
appellants company was in the joint venture specified in the waiver, and his flow-through expenses 
of the appellant were normally connected with the matter specified in the waiver.   
Additionally, in interpreting the word “participation” in the waiver, the court referred to 
the definition found in Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, the Oxford Dictionary, and the 
                                                 
57 Fagan v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 523 at para 35. The court referred to various decisions to show the importance of 
extrinsic evidence in interpreting a waiver. The cases were: Holmes v. The Queen, 2005 TCC 403; Guerette v R, [1996] 
1 CTC 2780; Mitchell v The Queen, 2002 FCA 407; Mah v. The Queen, 2003 TCC 720; and Brown v The Queen, 2006 
TCC 381.   
58 Fagan v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 523 at para 35.  
59 Fagan v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 523 at para 35. 
60 Fagan v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 523 at para 37. The court referred to Bailey v MNR, [1989] 2 CTC 2177 in making 
this statement.   
61 Fagan v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 523 at para 40. 
62 Fagan v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 523 at para 40.  
63 Fagan v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 523 at para 48.   
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Merriam-Webster Dictionary.64  These definitions, taken objectively, were sufficiently broad to 
capture the appellant’s situation and connect him to the matter in the waiver.   
Therefore, were the description in the waiver is defective, but the “substantive matter 
regarding the purpose of the waiver and the reassessment is clear to all parties”, the waiver is 
valid.65   
3.4.2. Fietz v The Queen, 2011 TCC 439 
In Fietz,66 the parties referred the question of whether the waiver filed with the Minister 
permitted the Minister to reassess beyond the normal reassessment period.  In this case, the waiver 
did not contain a description of the matters being waived, as the box identifying the matters in 
respect of which the waiver was being provided had been left blank. 
The TCC stated that a waiver is linked to a reassessment by operation of subsection 
152(4.01) of the ITA.67    The court must always “determine if a specific reassessment can 
reasonably be regarded as relating to a matter specified in a waiver”.68 
The taxpayer argued that since the waiver form (Form T2029) stated that “in order for a 
Waiver to be valid, the matter(s) being waived must be specified”, and since no matter was 
specified, the waiver was invalid.  The TCC stated that in order to determine the intentions of the 
parties so as to determine the scope of the waiver.   The intention of the parties “can be determined 
from the form and the surrounding circumstances”.69  In this case, the bank document was not 
meaningless given the effort the taxpayer undertook to find, fill out, and send it the document, but 
rather waived “the application of the normal reassessment period in relation to a proposed 
reassessment with respect to some matter”.70  The intention of the taxpayer was to “file a waiver 
                                                 
64 Fagan v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 523 at paras 49-52. 
65 Fagan v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 523 at para 53.  
66 Fietz v The Queen, 2011 TCC 439.   
67 Fietz v The Queen, 2011 TCC 439 at para 6.   
68 Fietz v The Queen, 2011 TCC 439 at para 46.  
69 Fietz v The Queen, 2011 TCC 439 at para 34.    
70 Fietz v The Queen, 2011 TCC 439 at para 34.   
This paper is a Draft, and may contain errors in spelling, grammar, and reference links.   
Page 17 of 30 
 
in relation to the proposed reassessment as set out in the Proposal Letter”.  The court held that the 
waiver in this case consisted of two documents: The waiver form and the Proposal Letter.71  
In coming to this conclusion, the court noted that no evidence was presented as to the 
intention of the lawyer, his assistant, or the taxpayer in relation to the waiver, and that none of 
these individuals testified during the hearing or filed any affidavits.72  The court referred to cases 
that established that where a party bears the evidentiary burden of establishing an issue, a failure 
to call necessary evidence justified the drawing of an adverse inference.73 The Minister bears the 
onus of proving that the taxpayer singed a waiver in relation to matters at issue in the reassessment, 
and in this case had established a prima facie case that the intention was to sign a waiver in respect 
to all matters in the Proposal Letter.  The onus of establishing a different intention rests with the 
taxpayer.  The court referred to the lack of evidence in seeking to argue for an alternate intention, 
therefore indicating that the extrinsic evidence of intention is admissible and relevant.   
3.4.3. Sljivar v The Queen, 2009 TCC 581 
The TCC, in Sljivar,74 was required to determine whether a waiver filed by the taxpayer 
was valid.  The taxpayer, an immigrant with limited education, was called into the CRA offices to 
sign a document. He did not read the document but was told that the document was just “part of 
the process”, and the CRA officer did not contain the nature or content of the document to him. 
The taxpayer testified that had he known what a waiver was, he would not have signed it.   
The court found that the taxpayer was in a hurry and did not even take the precaution of 
asking what he was signing.  Here, unlike the circumstances surround a debtor and creditor, the 
interest of the Taxpayer and the Minister are not opposite, and the waiver may be just as much to 
the interests of the taxpayer as the fisc.  The court saw the fact that the taxpayer continued to 
provide the Minister with documents after the expiry of the normal reassessment period as 
                                                 
71 Fietz v The Queen, 2011 TCC 439 at para 48. 
72 Fietz v The Queen, 2011 TCC 439 at paras 35-36. 
73 The cases referred to were: Bernardi (c.o.b. Bruno's Pizzeria & Main Street Billiards) v. Guardian Royal Exchange 
Assurance Co., [1979] O.J. No. 553 at para 28; and Milliken& Co. v. Interface Flooring Systems (Canada) Inc., 251 N.R. 
358, [2000] F.C.J. No. 129 (FCA).  
74 Sljivar v The Queen, 2009 TCC 581.   
This paper is a Draft, and may contain errors in spelling, grammar, and reference links.   
Page 18 of 30 
 
evidence that the waiver was serving its purpose: “to permit the taxpayer to provide additional 
information to prevent the proposed assessment.”75   There was no evidence of trickery on the part 
of the Minister, and the waiver was held to be valid.  
3.4.4. Brown v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 381 
The court in Brown76 specifically dealt with the relationship of a waiver under the ITA and 
a contract.  The court, at paragraph 26, clarified that a waiver is not to be interpreted in the same 
manner as a contract and stated: 
26        In my opinion, a waiver is not a contract between a taxpayer and Revenue Canada, 
excluding extrinsic evidence as to its interpretation. Quite the contrary. Relevant 
surrounding circumstances are important to determine whether a subsequent reassessment 
falls within the stated terms of a waiver. 
3.4.5. Honeywell Ltd v The Queen, 2006 TCC 325 
The TCC, in Honeywell,77 interpreted that the word “matter” in subsection 152(4.01) 
means, and stated that “a "matter" in subsection 152(4.01) means a separate subject matter or a 
discrete head of taxation”.78  In this case it was held that a GAAR recharacterization of a foreign 
affiliate’s income as interest received by a parent is a “fundamentally different subject matter or 
head of taxation, and therefore a different matter” from a FAPI assessment.79 It does not matter 
that the tax consequence of the alternate matter would be the same or similar for the taxpayer.    
3.4.6. Chafetz v. The Queen, 2005 TCC 803  
In Chafetz80 the court took a common sense approach to the interpretation of the scope of 
a waiver under the ITA.  Justice Miller stated:81 
                                                 
75 Sljivar v The Queen, 2009 TCC 581 at para 33.  
76 Brown v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 381.  
77 Honeywell Ltd v The Queen, 2006 TCC 325. 
78 Honeywell Ltd v The Queen, 2006 TCC 325 at para 21. 
79 Honeywell Ltd v The Queen, 2006 TCC 325 at para 21.   
80 Chafetz v. The Queen, 2005 TCC 803, aff’d 2007 FCA 45. 
81 Chafetz v. The Queen, 2005 TCC 803 at para 19. 
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19        If I am not prepared to accept either party’s stated intention of the meaning of the 
matter specified, it is for me to determine objectively what those words mean. Given the 
very nature of a waiver, a “matter specified” in a waiver must involve a substantial issue 
between the parties. As indicated in the oft-cited case of Solberg v. Canada, where both 
parties know what is at issue, a technical error will not invalidate the waiver. It is also clear 
(see Mah v. Canada) that the Minister cannot base a reassessment on a substantial issue 
that is not specified in the waiver. These cases lead me to conclude that, in determining the 
matter specified, I should seek the substantive issue. This interpretation of “matter” accords 
with Black’s Law of [sic] Dictionary interpretation being “a subject under consideration”. 
[emphasis added] 
3.4.7. Holmes v The Queen, 2005 TCC 403 
The TCC in Holmes,82 held that the matter specified in the waiver filed with the Minister 
cannot reasonably be regarded as relating to the matter the Minister reassessed on.  In order for the 
Minister to be able to reassess beyond the normal reassessment period in reliance of a waiver, the 
reassessment must, by operation of subparagraph 152(4.01)(a)(ii), reasonably related to a matter 
specified in the waiver.  This requirement was held to be consistent with the “general principle 
that the taxpayer must know the basis upon which she is being reassessed”.83  In determining the 
scope of the waivers, the TCC referred to a letter between the taxpayer and her accountant, as well 
as the waiver itself. The waiver stated that it was in respect of “1993 farming business [and 
employee profit sharing plan”, further restricted by an asterisk notation that referred to the matters 
set out in a specific CRA letter that concerned the adequacy of supporting information in relating 
the farming operations.84 
The TCC relied on the decision in Solberg85 in stating that it is appropriate to refer to the 
intention of the parties when determining the scope of a waiver.86  In this case, the communications 
between the taxpayer and the revenue agency only referred to the quantification and verification 
of the expenses, and there was no indication that this was only a preliminary step in determining 
the extent to which these expenses would be allowed.  The taxpayer’s past experience with having 
                                                 
82 Holmes v The Queen, 2005 TCC 403. 
83 Holmes v The Queen, 2005 TCC 403 at para 13.  See also Continental Bank of Canada v Canada, [1998] 2 SCR 358; 
and Pedwell v The Queen, [2000] 4 F.C. 616 (FCA). 
84 Holmes v The Queen, 2005 TCC 403 at para 15.   
85 Solberg v Canada, [1992] 2 CTC 208 (FCTD).   
86 Holmes v The Queen, 2005 TCC 403 at para 16.  
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expense denied on the same basis as in the purported reassessment, equally supported the revenue 
agency’s claim that she was aware that the waiver included this issue and the taxpayer’s desire to 
limit the waiver to exclude this issue.  The TCC also stated that the contra proferentum rule, and 
the resultant construction of the documents as against the drafter (the taxpayer as the final drafter), 
has no application to interpreting the scope of a waiver under the ITA.87  As such the court held 
that the Minister had failed to prove that the waiver extended beyond the verification of the 
expenses to reach their potential denial.  
3.4.8. Mah v The Queen, 2003 TCC 720 
In Mah,88 the taxpayer had signed a waiver that did not refer to any share, but the Minister 
reassessed to include in income a deemed dividend resulting from a share redemption.  The court 
set out a two stage process in dealing with reassessments and waivers: 
[7]      In order for me to determine whether the waiver signed by Ms. Mah permits the 
Minister to reassess under subsection 84(3) of the Act, I must first identify the matter 
specified in the waiver and, second, decide whether a reassessment under subsection 84(3) 
can "reasonably be regarded as relating to a matter specified in the waiver". 
In this case, in order to identify the matter specified in the waiver, the court had to refer to 
the language of the waiver and the contents of the letter specifically referred to in the waiver.  
Subparagraph 152(4.01)(a)(ii) requires a reasonable relationship between the subject matter 
specified in the waiver and the basis for the reassessment.  The court stated at paragraph 13 that 
“[i]t is quite clear that the Minister cannot base a reassessment on a substantive issue that is not 
specified in a waiver or cannot be regarded as relating to the substantive issue that is specified in 
the waiver.” 
Taxation is transaction based, and in this case the proposed reassessment, and therefore the 
waiver, referred to the one transaction only.  The Minister “cannot reassess on the basis of another 
transaction, event or circumstance that is not described in the waiver nor is reasonably related to 
                                                 
87 Holmes v The Queen, 2005 TCC 403 at para 19.   
88 Mah v The Queen, 2003 TCC 270. 
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it[, and a] distinction is to be drawn […] between a recalculation that necessarily flows from the 
mechanical application of the Act and a totally separate and unrelated transaction”.89 
The court specifically addressed the interpretation of waivers, and stated: 
[18]    Finally, the Courts have held that in interpreting a waiver, the judge should have 
regard to the intentions of the parties at the time the waiver was granted [Mitchell v. Her 
Majesty the Queen., 2002 F.C.A. 407 at paragraph 37]. One should also consider whether 
the party opposing the waiver can demonstrate any prejudice. In the appeal at bar, the 
waiver specifically referred to the CCRA's own proposal letter which set out the basis for 
the proposed reassessment. The letter was written three years after the share exchange and 
share redemption transactions. Again, the letter does not refer to subsection 84(3) or to the 
share redemption transaction. I am sure that Ms. Mah had no intention of opening up the 
share redemption transaction to reassessment under subsection 84(3) when she filed the 
waiver and it is probable that when the January 21, 2000 letter was written, the Minister 
did not consider anything other than a possible assessment based on a capital gain.  
[footnote deleted; citation and emphasis added] 
3.4.9. Stone Container (Canada) Inc v The Queen, 1998 CanLII 503 (TCC) 
The court referred to the purpose of the waiver and reassessment process, and stated at 
paras 27 and 28: 
[27] The phrase "in respect of" as it is used in the waiver signed by the appellant should 
not be regarded as wholly limiting the reassessment to the recalculation of the shareholder 
benefit to the exclusion of all other calculations. To do so would result in the absurd 
consequence that in having reassessed to include or exclude the shareholder benefit 
amount, the Minister would then be unable to correspondingly adjust the taxable income, 
tax payable and other necessarily related amounts. Too narrow a construction of the phrase 
"in respect of" would render the reassessment process futile, an outcome that could not 
have been intended by the parties given the very execution of the waiver, and would run 
counter to the very purpose of a reassessment. On the other hand, nor should the intention 
be said to have been to grant the Minister boundless authority to reassess -- too broad a 
construction of the phrase "with respect to" would render the specification of an item in a 
waiver an equally futile endeavour. 
[28] The words "in respect of" in the form of waiver, subject to evidence of a contrary 
intention, limit the scope of the potential reassessment to (i) the matter specified and (ii) 
those items the calculation of which necessarily flow from or are immediately connected 
with the recalculation of the matter in the waiver. 
                                                 
89 Mah v The Queen, 2003 TCC 270 at paras 14-15.  
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Therefore, the court held that the phrase "in respect of" limited the application related to 
the matter specified and the calculation for any items that necessarily flow from, or are normally 
connected to, the matter specified.  
3.4.10. Merswolke v The Queen, 95 DTC 821 
The taxpayer signed a waiver with respect of rental income and expenses related to rental 
property, and did not refer to capital gains on the disposition of the property.  The agreed statement 
of acts stated that the capital gains realized on the disposition of the property are not reasonably 
regarded as relating to a matter specified in the waiver.   
The court held that a substantive issue not specified in the waiver cannot be relied on by 
the Minister in supporting an assessment after the normal reassessment period.   
3.4.11. Placements TS v The Queen, 94 DTC 1302 
The taxpayer argued that the waiver referred to a right in respect of property, and that this 
was a distinct property from the building and the land.  The Minister’s reassessment related to the 
disposal of the building and land and not to the disposal of the right of first refusal in respect of 
the building and land.   
The court noted that the purpose of a waiver was to “allow for the continued analysis of a 
transaction or of a matter where there is uncertainty regarding the basis of the assessment”.  Given 
this purpose, the court held that the description of the matter provided in the waiver need not be 
perfect.  As long as the assessment relates to the transaction or matter which is the source of the 
disagreement between the Minister and the taxpayer, and concerning which the taxpayer signed a 
waiver, the waiver is valid.  The court also noted that it cannot be said that the taxpayer is taken 
by surprise by the assessment.   
3.4.12. Bailey v The Minister of National Revenue, 89 DTC 416 (TCC) 
 In Bailey,90 Justice Rip, as he then was, stated at page 419: 
                                                 
90 Bailey v The Minister of National Revenue, 89 DTC 416 (TCC). 
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A waiver is usually given by a taxpayer to the Respondent when there is an unresolved 
dispute over one or more specific matters and the three year time period within which the 
Respondent may reassess is fast approaching. The execution of a waiver avoids a hasty 
reassessment by the Respondent; it provides the taxpayer with further opportunity to 
consider adjustments proposed by the Respondent and to allow him to make further 
representations to support his claim. 
In dealing with the interrelation of the word “reasonable” in the phrase “reasonably relate 
to the matter specified in the waiver”, the court stated that reasonable is not the subjective view of 
either party, but rather “the view of an objective observe with a knowledge of all the pertinent 
facts”.91  In determining the scope of the waiver and the meaning of the words used, the court 
referred to extrinsic evidence, being the negotiations between the taxpayer and the Minister's 
officers.   
4. Summary of Guidance from the Judicial Decisions 
When it comes to general guidance in how to interpret the scope and content of a waiver 
of limitation periods under subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii), the cases above support two alternate 
approaches.  When it comes to specific guidance, however, the cases appear (for the most part) to 
be consistent.  This portion of the paper will first consider the alternate general approaches 
promoted in the paper, and then will consider the specific guidance offered by the judicial 
approaches.   
4.1. General Interpretive Approaches 
The two general approaches supported by the cases considered above are the statutory 
interpretive approach and the contractual interpretive approach.  
4.1.1. Statutory Interpretive Approach 
The comments of the Federal Court in Soldberg92 could be interpreted as supporting an 
interpretive approach to waiver that mirrors that of the approach used for interpreting taxing 
                                                 
91 Bailey v The Minister of National Revenue, 89 DTC 416 (TCC).  The court referred to the decision in Canadian 
Propane Gas & Oil Limited v MNR, [1972] CTC 566; 73 DTC 5019 in interpreting “reasonable”.   
92 Soldberg v The Queen, [1992] 2 CTC 208 (FCTD).   
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statutes themselves.93  The Court stated that the “appropriate approach to the interpretation of the 
waiver is to seek to ascertain the intention of the parties as expressed in that document together 
with any relevant circumstances”, and that this “is consistent with the approach taken in 
interpreting taxing statutes themselves”.94  Soldberg is the only decision the author encountered 
that refers expressly to statutory interpretation when interpreting waivers of limitation periods.95   
Although intention (specifically the intention of the legislature) is a consideration in 
statutory interpretation, the involvement of two parties (even if one is a government body) would 
put the interpretation of intention closer to the contractual camp.  That said, the statutory approach 
is clearly appropriate when giving meaning to the provisions that allow for the creation, 
functioning, and scope of the waiver.  Some of the ITA provisions, particularly those that delineate 
the scope of the waiver, can be seen as statutory terms that have to be read into the waiver contact.  
His is similar to the terms that must be incorporated when interpreting various otherwise private 
contracts such as terms in residential tenancy acts that have to be read into rental agreements, or 
terms in sales of goods acts that have to be read into various consumer contracts.   
The courts have also interpreted terms that are found in the ITA and the form of the Waiver, 
using dictionaries.96  However, this would support both the statutory and the contractual 
interpretive approaches.   
                                                 
93 Soldberg v The Queen, [1992] 2 CTC 208 (FCTD) at para 13, by reference to the approach to interpreting taxing 
statutes advanced by the Supreme Court of Canada in Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, 1984 CanLII 20 (SCC), 
[1984] 1 SCR 536. 
94 Soldberg v The Queen, [1992] 2 CTC 208 (FCTD) at para 13.   
95 The Comments in a number of decision, however, would be more appropriate when interpreting a statute than a 
contract. These include the statement in Honeywell Ltd v The Queen, 2007 FCA 22 at para 32, that the Minister 
cannot issue a reassessment that does not reasonably related to the matter specified in the waiver.  This is both a 
limitation and an expansion found in the Act.  It is an expansion, when compared to a contractual approach, because 
it reads into the waiver matters not specified in the waiver, but that a reasonable person would consider to be 
related to that matter(s) in the waiver.  Courts have historically been hesitant, when faced with contracts between 
private parties, to expand the scope of the contract to include what a reasonable person would have contracted for.   
96 See for example Mitchel v The Queen, 2002 FCA 407. 
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4.1.2. Contractual Interpretive Approach 
As stated above, support for the statutory interpretive approach is provided by cases that 
refer to the nature of the waiver as a “bargain”97, an “accommodation”,98 or a “consensual 
agreement”.99  Additionally, the dominant approach to interpreting waivers in the case law, the 
ascertaining of the intention of the parties as expressed in the document of the waiver along with 
the relevant circumstances, strongly implies a contractual approach to interpretation.100 Further 
support for a contractual interpretive approach is provided by: the taxpayer and the Minister being 
unable to alter the waiver once given and filed;101 basing scope of a waiver on what both parties 
knew was at issue;102 whether a party has suffered prejudice on any of the alternate 
interpretations;103  
A. Christina Tari has argued that despite the fact that principles of contract law have often 
been considered in the context where a waiver is challenged, the law of contract is not technically 
applicable.104 Ms Tari’s argument is based on her belief that, in respect of a waiver of limitation 
periods, a waiver cannot constitute a contract as no mutual consideration is exchanged.  She is of 
the view that it is only the taxpayer that gives consideration in giving up a statutory right, while 
“no apparent consideration is provided by the Minister when a taxpayer grants a waiver of a 
                                                 
97 Honeywell Ltd v The Queen, 2007 FCA 22 at para 32. 
98 CAL Investments Ltd v The Queen, [1991] 1 FC 199.  
99 CAL Investments Ltd v The Queen, [1991] 1 FC 199 at pages 217-18.  
100 See Geoff R Hall, Canadian Contractual Interpretation Law, 2nd ed (LexisNexis: Markham, ON, 2012), where the 
author stated, in Chapter 2, that the fundamental principles of contractual interpretation is to accurately identify 
the intentions of the parties by considering the words in the contract in light of their context.  The author states that 
a contract cannot be interpreted independent of its context, with context referring to the surrounding circumstances 
that give rise to the contact.  This is the factual matrix within which the contract’s words have to be given meaning. 
See also the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., 2005 SCC 62; and 
in Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and Highways), 2010 SCC 4.  
101 Honeywell Ltd v The Queen, 2007 FCA 22 at para 32. 
102 See Mitchell v The Queen, 2002 FCA 407.  This appears analogous to looking at whether there was a meeting of 
the minds, and what an outside observer would consider to have been the agreement given the words of the 
agreement and the context.  
103 The consideration of prejudice to a party appears to be very similar to circumstances of partial performance in 
contract law, or the doctrine of promissory estopple.  However, this consideration also is similar to considerations 
of procedural fairness in administrative law, particularly knowing the case to meet and having an opportunity to be 
heard on the relevant issues/factors. 
104 A Christina Tari, supra note .   
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limitation period”.  This interpretation is not supported by either the judicial commentary or the 
contract law understanding of consideration. It is important to recognise that consideration is for 
each promise made, and not for the contract as a whole.105  To be legally sufficient, there must be 
something of detriment to the promisor or something of benefit to the promisee, but there is no 
requirement that there be an offsetting benefit/detriment.106  An exchange of promises is sufficient 
consideration in most cases.107 
In Honeywell, the Federal Court of Appeal stated that “the taxpayer foregoes the benefit of 
the normal prescripton [sic] period for the particular year” and the Minister “acquires the right to 
reassess outside the normal reassessment period, but only with respect of the matter specified in 
the waiver”.108  In doing do, the Minister is forgoing the right to make an assessment, within the 
normal reassessment period, irrespective of any information provided by the taxpayer.109 Thus 
both the Minister and the Taxpayer are foregoing rights, presumably because both see some benefit 
in doing so.110  Either the foregoing of a right, being the suffering of a detriment, or the gaining of 
a benefit by each party, is sufficient consideration.111   
However, there are also issues that work against the contractual approach.  For example, 
unlike a contact, the Minister as a party, does not have the option of not accepting a waiver.112  
                                                 
105 Chitty on Contracts, supra, at para 3-004.   
106 Chitty on Contracts, supra, at para 3-005.  The lack of offset only means that a benefit to the promisee is sufficient 
even if there is no detriment to the promisor, and a detriment to the promisor is sufficient, even if there is no benefit 
to the promisee.   
107 Chitty on Contracts, supra, at para 3-008.  It’s important to distinguish between “motivation” for making the 
promise, and consideration for the promise.  Motivation cannot serve as consideration.   
108 Honeywell Ltd v The Queen, 2007 FCA 22 at para 32. 
109 ITA, supra note 1 at subsection 152(7).  
110 A benefit for the taxpayer was identified in CAL Investments Ltd v The Queen, [1991] 1 FC 199, where the court 
stated that a waiver relieves the taxpayer of the greater burden of disproving the Minister’s assumptions where the 
Crown (faced with the expiry of a limitation period) issues a protective reassessment that contains “many sundry 
items that the taxpayer would have to traverse one by one”.  In that decision, the Federal Court refers to the “mutual 
advantages to both the Crown and the taxpayer” in agreeing to a waiver.  
111 The courts, in looking for consideration, are only concerned with the sufficiency of the consideration and not with 
its adequacy.  See Thomas v Thomas (1842), 2 QB 851.  See also Chitty on Contracts, 31st edition, Volume I, (Sweet 
& Maxwell: London, 2012) paras 3-001 to 3-005.   
112 See Mitchell v The Queen, 2002 FCA 407.   
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Also, unlike a contract,113 the courts have held that a technical defect has been held not to impair 
the functioning of a waiver where the substance of the matter is or ought to have been clear between 
the Minister and the taxpayer.114  The exclusion of the application of the contra proferentum 
rule,115 and the statement that (unlike a commercial lender borrower relationship) the interest of 
the Minister and the taxpayer are not always in opposition, also challenge the contractual 
interpretive approach. 
Potentially most damaging to the contractual interpretive approach is the statement in 
Brown,116 cited with approval in Fagan,117 that a waiver is not a contract “whose interpretation 
must exclude extrinsic evidence” but rather, in interpreting a waiver, “relevant surrounding 
circumstances play an important role in its interpretation”.118  However, the comments in Brown 
appear to be directed at limiting the application of the parole evidence rule, and promoting the 
consideration of the factual matrix, rather than a characterization of waivers as something other 
than a contract.  It may be that the court, quite properly, was recognizing the statutory and 
administrative nature of a waiver, that it the waiver is often a document that refers (directly or 
impliedly) to matters discussed in other documents,119 and that must be given effect in light of its 
role in administrating the ITA.   
4.2.Specific Guidance 
4.2.1. Nature and Purpose of Waiver 
A waiver given by a taxpayer and accepted by the Minister is said to give rise to a bargain of 
sorts,120 being a consensual agreement between the taxpayer and the Crown to accept a delay in 
                                                 
113 In a contract, where the error effects the substance of the agreement, the courts are unlikely to find an 
interpretation that give effect to the substance absent a claim of mutual mistake and an application for rectification.  
114 Soldberg v The Queen, [1992] 2 CTC 208 at para 13.  
115 Holmes v The Queen, 2005 TCC 403. 
116 Brown v The Queen, 2006 TCC 381. 
117 Fagan v The Queen, 2011 TCC 523. 
118 Fagan v The Queen, 2011 TCC 523. 
119 See for example the decision in Fietz v The Queen, 2011 TCC 429, where the court held that the blank waiver form 
and the Proposal Letter together formed the waiver.  
120 Honeywell Ltd v The Queen, 2007 FCA 22 at para 32.  
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the process for reasons that are mutually advantageous.121  This statement supports the contractual 
interpretive approach to determining the scope of a waiver.   
The purpose of a waiver is to allow for the better administration of the Income Tax,122 and 
provide a more efficient determination of the tax consequences attaching to a taxpayer’s affairs.123   
It is meant to give both parties the benefit of additional time to allow for the continued analysis of 
the maters in dispute and the consideration of additional submissions and evidence.124 
4.2.2. Connection between the waiver and the reassessment 
There is a connection between the issue under appeal and the waiver,125 such that a waiver 
must relate to a substantive issue between the parties.126  In interpreting a waiver and determining 
the scope, through identifying the intention of the parties, the courts must always remain cognizant 
of the fact that a waiver must relate to a transaction or matter that is a source of disagreement 
between the Minister and the taxpayer.127  This connection has led the court to conclude that the 
word “matter” in subsection 152(4.01) means a separate subject matter or a discrete head of 
taxation,128 being a substantive issue between the parties,129 such that the minister cannot reassess 
on the basis of a transaction, circumstance or event not described in the waiver (or not reasonably 
related to what is described in the waiver).  However, this same connection has also resulted in the 
court stating that a waiver necessarily includes other issues that necessarily flow from the 
mechanical application of the ITA,130 or that are immediately connected with the recalculation of 
the matter in the waiver.131  
                                                 
121 CAL Investments Ltd v The Queen, [1991] 1 FC 199 at pages 217-18.   
122 See CAL Investments Ltd v The Queen, [1991] 1 FC 199 at pages 217-18.   
123 Ibid 
124 Mitchell v The Queen, 2002 FCA 407. 
125 Placements T.S. Inc. v. The Queen, [1994] 1 CTC 2464, 94 DTC 1302. 
126 See Mitchell v The Queen, 2002 FCA 407.   
127 Mitchell v The Queen, 2002 FCA 407. 
128 Honeywell Ltd v The Queen, 2006 TCC 325. 
129 Chafetz v The Queen, 2005 TCC 803. 
130 Mah v The Queen, 2003 TCC 720. 
131 Stone Container (Canada) Inc v The Queen, 1998 CanLII 503 (TCC). 
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4.2.3. Deficiencies in a Waiver 
The Courts have held that a waiver is not invalid merely because the waiver contains a 
technical error that is due to a “careless mistake”,132 where a substantive error is one that does not 
result in a reassessment that surprises the taxpayer,133 or because there is a technical defect that 
does not impair the substance of the waiver.134  Because the waiver is a document that allows for 
continued examination in the face of disagreement or uncertainty, the wording of the waiver need 
not be perfect.135 So long as neither party is surprised or prejudiced by the basis of the 
reassessment, then the waiver is operative despite a deficiency.  
5. Conclusions 
The courts have provided some guidance in interpreting waivers of limitation period sin 
context of the ITA, but they have not yet provided a comprehensive approach to interpreting 
waivers. The interpretation of a waiver involves a two-step process:136 
i. Identification of the matter specified in the waiver; and  
ii. Determination of whether the reassessment can reasonably be regarded as relating to 
the matter specified in the waiver.  
In performing those two steps, the courts have to interpret the words of the ITA that 
delineate the application and scope of the paper, and in doing so they have to resort to principles 
of statutory interpretation.  Given that the waiver incorporates the statutory provisions into itself, 
the interpretation of the waiver may at times call on the court to resort to statutory interpretation 
principles hen interpreting the waiver. 
That said, the waiver is also a negotiated agreement between the Minister and the Taxpayer, 
not dissimilar to a contract among private parties.  Although some contractual interpretive rules 
                                                 
132 Gestion B. Dufresne Ltée v. the Queen (1998), 98 D.T.C. 2078.  
133 Placements T.S. Inc. v. The Queen, [1994] 1 CTC 2464, 94 DTC 1302. 
134 Solberg (S.J.) v. Canada, [1992] 2 CTC 208, 92 DTC 6448. 
135 See Placements T.S. Inc. v. The Queen, [1994] 1 CTC 2464, 94 DTC 1302; see also Bailey v The Minister of National 
Revenue, 89 DTC 416 (TCC). 
136 Mah v The Queen, 2003 TCC 720. 
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must be modified to account for the unique statutory and administrative context of waivers in 
respect to limitation periods in the ITA, contact law principles ought to play an important role in 
interpreting waivers.  
Finally, a waiver is part of an administrative process, thus importing Administrative law 
principles into the interpretation of waivers.   
In interpreting waivers, the courts must be cognizant of the part that the item being 
interpreted plays in the overall process, and then apply (as appropriate) either statutory or contract 
law principles, necessarily modified to fit the administrative context of waivers.  
